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1 Introduction
The scarcity of resources forces policy makers to prioritize between policies. To secure an efficient resource
allocation benefit-cost analysis (BCA), in which the social benefits of a policy or investment are compared
to its costs, is often used. The monetary value of reducing road mortality risk is usually (together with the
monetary value of reduced travel time) one of the dominating components of the benefit side in BCA of
transport investments and policies.1 This study examines preferences for safety and in conventional BCA
the monetary benefit measure of reducing mortality risk, the value of a statistical life (VSL), is based on
the preferences of purely self-interested individuals. In many cases, as pointed out by, e.g., Becker (1976)
and Sen (1987), it is clear that people do not act only as self-interested individuals but in a context of
social interaction, and if individuals are not purely self-interested but also concerned about the safety of
others, it would seem reasonable, and has been argued, that the value of safety should be augmented by
an amount that reflects this altruistic component (Mishan, 1971; Jones-Lee, 1976; Needleman, 1976).
Bergstrom (1982) showed, however, that when individuals can be characterized as pure (or non-
paternalistic) altruists, their VSL will be identical to the VSL derived under pure self-interest.2 Hence,
he showed that it will be inappropriate to include an altruistic component in the VSL, and willingness to
pay (WTP) for others’ safety should be ignored in BCA.3 Jones-Lee (1991, 1992) extended the analysis
and proved that Bergstrom’s result is also valid when preferences are purely paternalistic, but when
preferences are safety-paternalistic (cares only about the safety argument in the utility function of others)
benevolence should be considered in BCA. Since whether VSL should be augmented or not depends on
the form of altruism, and the benefits of reducing the risk can be decisive for the outcome of a BCA, it
is important not only to study the magnitude of non-selfishness, but also the form it takes.
Several studies have empirically examined individuals’ WTP for others’ safety (health). For instance,
there is empirical evidence which implies that individuals are safety-paternalistic (Va´zquez Rodr´ıguez
and Leo´n, 2004; Jacobsson et al., 2007; Holmes, 1990). Moreover, Liu et al. (2000), Dickie and Messman
(2004) and Chanel et al. (2005) found that mothers and parents were willing to pay more for the safety
of their children than for their own safety, Dickie and Gerking (2007) that parents were paternalistic
altruists towards their children, and Bateman and Brouwer (2006) and Chanel et al. (2005) that WTP
1 Persson and Lindqvist (2003) showed for Sweden that approximately half of the benefits to society of road
projects can be attributable to increased traffic safety.
2 Non-paternalistic preferences require that “each individual respect the tastes of others, no matter what he
thinks of them” (Archibald and Donaldson, 1976, p. 494). A pure paternalist, on the other hand, is concerned
about others but ignores their preferences.
3 The argument that pure altruistic preferences can be ignored in BCA was generalized in Bergstrom (2006)
Benevolence and the value of road safety 3
for the entire household is larger than individual WTP.4 However, Leung and Guria (2006) found the
opposite for household WTP, with single household having the highest WTP and inconclusive results
regarding WTP for child safety. It also seems that most of the empirical evidence shows that individuals
are not prepared to pay as much for a public safety measure as for a private measure, even though there
is also evidence of the opposite (Viscusi et al., 1988; Johannesson et al., 1996; Aran˜a and Leo´n, 2002;
de Blaeij et al., 2003; Hultkrantz et al., 2006). Hence, the overall evidence regarding altruism seems
inconclusive.
The aim of this study is to further contribute to the empirical analysis of altruism and safety. We
explore the domain of selfish and non-selfish safety preferences in a set of questions on road safety, and
the safety impact of our good extends from purely private impacts, to impacts on children, the whole
household, to relatives and friends and is finally defined as a public good. In order to elicit the preferences
for reducing road risk we use the contingent valuation method (CVM) on a Swedish sample.5 Due to
the public good characteristic of many public safety programmes and the fact that traffic safety may be
achieved through both public programmes and private provision, it is interesting to examine safety both
as a private and a public good. By examining respondents’ WTP for different devices (public/private)
and for own and others’ safety, we may draw conclusions regarding individuals’ altruistic preferences.
In the following sections 2, 3, and 4 we describe the theoretical framework, how the survey was
conducted, the design of the questionnaire, and the empirical models. Section 5 contains the results. Our
results indicate that the respondents of our survey are not purely selfish, but are prepared to pay for
the safety of children, relatives and friends. Given that people show strong concern for their relatives’
and friends’ safety, we may expect that safety for a public safety measure is valued higher than a private
safety device. We find, however, that WTP for the public good is significantly lower compared with the
private good. We discuss our findings and draw some conclusions in section 6.
2 The theoretical framework
The theoretical model in this section, due to Jones-Lee (1991, 1992) and Johannesson et al. (1996), is
a single-period model in which individuals face two possible outcomes; staying alive or being dead. Let
Vij(.), piij , and yij denote a well-behaved utility function (see, e.g., Varian, 1992), survival probabilities,
4 Depending on elicitation format, Bateman and Brouwer (2006) only found weak support for their hypothesis.
See also Bateman and Brouwer (2006) for references to other studies that have found a higher value of WTP for
child safety.
5 In the CVM respondents are asked to state their WTP for a non-marked good, e.g. wildlife protection,
increased air quality, or as in this a reduction in mortality risk. The CVM is a stated-preference technique, i.e.
respondents’ preferences are elicited in a hypothetical setting. For a description of CVM see, e.g., Mitchell and
Carson (1989) or Bateman et al. (2002).
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and wealth, respectively. For simplicity we assume a model with only two individuals and the subscript
i = {1, 2} refers to the individuals with 1 defining the considered individual. The second subscript
j = {0, 1} refers to before (0) and with (1) the safety project, with pii0 < pii1. Our utility function can
now be written as follows:
V10 = V10(pi10, y10, pi20, y20), (1)
which is assumed to be strictly increasing in pi1j and y1j , and non-decreasing in pi2j and y2j . We consider
the following cases where the considered individual is: (i) purely selfish if ∂V1j/∂pi2j = 0 and ∂V1j/∂y2j =
0, (ii) a pure altruist if both are strictly positive and the preference of others are respected6, (iii) a pure
paternalist if again both are strictly positive but others’ preferences are disregarded, and (iv) a safety
paternalist if ∂V1j/∂pi2j > 0 and ∂V1j/∂y2j = 0. In the last case the individual only cares about one
aspect regarding others’ well-being, i.e. safety. If, on the other hand, the individual only cares about
others’ wealth levels, he/she would be wealth paternalistic.
We start by deriving WTP for a private and a public safety measure following the analysis in Jo-
hannesson et al. (1996). Both safety measures affect individuals in the same way, the difference being
the characteristic of the good and the way it is financed. The private good is paid for by the individual,
whereas the public good is financed through a lump-sum tax. The optimization problems can be written
as follows:
V11(pi11, y10 − p1, pi20, y20) = V10, (2)
V11(pi11, y10 − t1, pi21, y20 − t1) = V10, (3)
where p1 in Eq. (2) refers to WTP for the private risk reduction and t1 in Eq. (3) is the WTP for the
public safety measure. A selfish and a safety paternalistic individual would report t1 = p1 and t1 > p1,
respectively. Whereas a pure altruist who believes that t1 approximates the WTP of the other individual
would report t1 = p1 (since i = 2 remains at his/her initial utility), if he/she believes that the project
will increase (reduce) the other person’s overall wellbeing he/she would state t1 > (<)p1.
We now turn to different scenarios where we examine an individual’s WTP for a private good safety
device that will increase the survival probability of someone else. Let p2 denote our considered individual’s
WTP for a safety device for i = 2, and the optimization problem may now be written as:
6 For a pure altruist, (∂V1j/∂pi2j)/(∂V1j/∂y2j) = (∂V2j/∂pi2j)/(∂V2j/∂y2j), since he/she respects the prefer-
ences of others.
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V11(pi10, y10 − p2, pi21, y20) = V10. (4)
It can be shown that p2 > 0 when individual 1 is a safety paternalist, a pure altruist or paternalist.
Using Eq. (4) we can also examine intra-household WTP, where we assume that the second individual
is a child with zero wealth, i.e. y2 = 0. Thus, in this scenario y1 is the household’s wealth level and we
assume that the child’s consumption comes from the wealth of the parent and that expenditures for
the child’s risk reduction will be borne by the parent. Unless the parent is wealth paternalistic, p2 > 0.
It can also be shown that p2 is the largest when the parent is safety paternalistic. Whether p2 R p1
depends on the parent’s preferences for the safety of his/her child. Finally, let ph define household WTP
(p1+p2 ≡ ph). When both individuals experience an increase in survival probability, Eq. (4) also implies
that ph > p1 for a safety paternalist or a pure altruist or paternalist.
3 Contingent valuation survey
The survey was conducted in the city of O¨rebro by mail in 1998. Prior to the main survey a pilot was
used to decide on the bid levels. The sample in the main survey consisted of 1,950 individuals between
18-76 years of age, and after two reminders the response rate was 55 percent. The sample was split
into five groups in order to examine how the respondents’ WTP was affected by which of the following
subjects benefited from the safety measure: (i) own, (ii) child, (iii) household, (iv) relatives and friends,
and (v) the public. The safety measure for the first four groups was a private good, but a public one in
the last subsample. The group that received the question on child safety consisted of households with at
least one child younger than 18; addresses to these households were in the mother’s name.7
In order to mitigate the well known problem of individuals’ judgement of small probabilities , including
perception of mortality risk, and to make the safety measure more understandable, the risk reduction
was presented as an elimination of fatalities and severe injuries in road-traffic (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Kahneman et al., 1982; Hakes and Viscusi, 2004; Andersson and Lundborg, 2007). An elimination
(in the long run) of fatalities and severe causalities in road-traffic is a national aim of the Swedish
transport policy (Vision zero (Prop. 1997/98:56, 1998)), an aim that has received a lot of attention in
the Swedish media. The city of O¨rebro was chosen for the survey, since the municipality has prepared a
traffic safety programme in accordance with Vision zero. This has also been covered in the local press,
and we, therefore, believe that a scenario with zero fatalities and severe injuries (in accordance with
7 Addresses for this kind of household were only available in the mothers’ names, which is why questionnaires
were only sent out to women.
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Vision zero) is credible for the people of O¨rebro. The same risk scenario to elicit WTP was used in
Hultkrantz et al. (2006).
3.1 Questionnaire
All questionnaires included information about the number of fatalities and severe injuries in O¨rebro
during 1996 and 1997 and the mean for the period 1993 to 1997, the distribution of the fatalities and
severe injuries between modes of transport in a pie-chart, and the actual location of the last year’s
accidents on a town map.8 The annual risk was communicated to the respondents in the following way:
O¨rebro has approximately 120,000 inhabitants. In a group of 10,000 inhabitants, around 2 persons
will be killed or severely injured annually in urban traffic if the safety situation is not improved.
[Table 1 about here.]
The five subsamples are found in Table 1 together with sample sizes and response rates. In question-
naires Q1-Q4 the safety measure was a private good, whereas in Q5 it was a public good. Both goods
were abstract safety devices reducing the risk to zero. The private safety device would reduce the risk
to zero for the user of the device and could be rented on an annual basis. The subsample that was
asked about a device for themselves (Q1 Private) is used as the reference group in our study and it was
presented with the following scenario:
“Assume that a traffic safety device is developed to reduce the fatality and severe injury risk
to zero within an urban area, e.g. O¨rebro. The device may be used by pedestrians, cyclists, and
motorists. The device may be rented annually and reduces the risk to zero, as mentioned, but
only for the users of the device; it cannot be shared by others. Remember that the rent has to be
paid with the annual income of the household.”
The respondents were then asked whether they were willing to pay a given price for the safety device,
i.e. a single bounded dichotomous choice questions:
Would you rent the device for your own use for SEK 200 per year?
In total six bid levels were used, Bid = {200; 1, 000; 2, 000; 5, 000; 10, 000; 20, 000}, where the levels were
based on the results of the pilot study.9
8 The average number of fatalities and severe injuries between 1993-1997 was 3 and 16, respectively. The
distribution of accidents with severe or fatal outcome was (percent); bicycle 66, car 21, pedestrian 10, moped 2
and motorcycle 1.
9 Monetary values in Swedish kronor (SEK) in 1998 prices. USD 1 ≈ SEK 8
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The other groups that were asked about the private device (Q2-Q4) were asked similar questions that
had been adjusted to fit each scenario. For instance, in Q2 Child the safety device was to be used by
one of the respondent’s children younger than 18 and living at home. Moreover, in the question about
household safety (Q3 Household), the respondent was asked about a device that would reduce the risk
for all members of the household. In the question about total household safety, the bid levels above were
doubled, since respondents were asked about a safety device that would reduce the risk for more than
one person.
In addition, two subsamples were asked about their willingness to purchase a similar device for
a relative or a friend (Q3 and Q4). The subsample Q3 Household was asked about a safety device
for a relative/friend after being asked about household safety, whereas Q4 Relative was only asked
about a safety device for a relative/friend, this in order to simplify the task (which also eased the
budget constraint). Both subsamples were also asked about the number of devices they were prepared
to purchase. The scenario was as follows (Q3 Household):
“Assume that you can rent one similar device for someone outside the household (e.g. a relative or
a friend). The device can be used where the person lives. The person has not received and will not
receive the offer to rent such a device. You have to pay the rent and cannot demand compensation
from the person.”
Would you rent the device to someone outside the household (relatives or friends) for SEK
200 per year and person?
“Assume that you got the opportunity to rent additional devices for the same cost (SEK 200 per
year and person).”
Would you rent more devices? (0;1;2-10;>10)
Figure 1 describes the questionnaire scheme for relatives’ safety (Q3 and Q4). In both questionnaires,
only respondents who were willing to rent the device for relatives were asked if they were prepared to
buy their relatives a voucher for free consumption. The purpose of the follow-up question was to be able
to distinguish between pure altruistic or paternalistic preferences and safety paternalistic preferences.
Respondents who are safety paternalists will not answer yes to the follow-up question which was presented
as follows:
“If you answered yes to the question to rent a device for one person outside the household (relative
or friend) for SEK 200 per year, what is your response to the following: Instead of the safety device
you can purchase a voucher for SEK 200 per person; he/she can then choose to rent the safety
device for one year or use it for some other purpose that he/she would prefer.”
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Would you buy a voucher for someone outside the household (relative or friend) for SEK
200 per year and person?
[Figure 1 about here.]
The public good (Q5 Public) was an unspecified safety program and the respondents were assured it
would not affect their freedom to choose the transport mode, the quality of the trip, speed or the urban
environment. The payment vehicle for the public good was an annual fee earmarked for a traffic safety
fund within the municipality. It was highlighted that all other individuals within the municipality also
had to pay the fee. This subsample was asked the following question:
Would you pay SEK 200 per year to a traffic safety fund in the municipality to ensure that this
programme was introduced in O¨rebro?
4 Empirical models
We analyze our data using both non-parametric and parametric estimation techniques. For the non-
parametric estimation we use the Turnbull lower bound (TB) estimator of WTP (Turnbull, 1976).10 Let
wj and F (wj) denote the bid and the the proportion of no answers to the offered bid. Based on the
assumptions that no respondent has a negative or infinitive WTP, i.e. F (0) = 0 and F (∞) = 1, TB
mean WTP is estimated by
ETB [WTP ] =
J∑
j=0
wj (F (wj+1)− F (wj)) , (5)
where F (wj) should be weakly monotonically increasing. When F (wj) is non-monotonic, the pooled
adjustment violators algorithm (PAVA) needs to be used prior to the estimation of Eq. (5) (Turnbull,
1976; Ayer et al., 1955).
When analyzing the data in the parametric model we assume a standard logistic distribution of the
acceptance probability (Φ) of the bid for the risk change from pi0 to pi1:
Φ =
[
1 + e−∆v
]−1
, (6)
where ∆v is the expected change in the utility level following from the safety improvement. To examine
the acceptance probability we use a logit model.
Let X denote a vector of other covariates of the model. When the safety device is a private commodity
we can rule out negative WTP (purchase is voluntary) and estimate the mean WTP (w) as the area
10 This estimator is also known as the Kaplan-Meier estimator (Carson and Hanemann, 2005).
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under the survival function for non-negative WTP values (Johansson, 1995). For the multivariate case
mean WTP is estimated as:
w =
∫ ∞
0
[
1 + eα+βw+XΓ
]−1
dw = −(1/β) [ln (1 + eα+XΓ )] . (7)
where α, β, and Γ denote the constant, the coefficient of the bid, and a parameter vector of the other
covariates in the logit regression. Mean WTP for the different safety measures is evaluated by running
separate regressions for the subsamples, and then using the same values (the means of the pooled sample)
for the variables of X. This way we account for differences of the subsamples, but mean WTP is estimated
for an “identical representative individual”. In order to examine the effect of both the safety measure
and respondent characteristics on WTP, we also run a regression on the pooled sample. We choose the
bid-function approach, developed by Cameron (1988), instead of the utility-function approach (Hane-
mann, 1984) for the pooled regression. The reason for choosing the bid-function approach, is because its
coefficients show the covariates marginal effect on WTP, which we believe are of more interest to the
readers than their effect on utility.11
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
In addition to follow-up questions on background characteristics of the respondents, the questionnaire
also included questions on the travel patterns of the respondent and his/her household (car mileage, car
and bus trips in O¨rebro, distance walking and cycling) and risk perception. The descriptive statistics for
variables used in this study are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
We used a qualitative measure for respondents’ risk perception (lower, same, or higher risk compared
to the average). As shown in Table 2, 5 and 17 percent stated that their risk was higher and lower,
respectively, than the average in O¨rebro. Thus, almost 80 percent perceived their risk to be the same as
the average. If we compare this to an objective risk estimate, which is based on the respondents’ own
travel pattern together with objective risk estimates for the different modes, the average of the estimated
objective risks in the sample is close to the objective average risk in the city, 19.6 compared with 20 per
100,000.12 Moreover, the respondents were asked about injury experience as a result of road accidents
and whether they used luminous tags (an object that is worn by pedestrians in the dark to reflect the
11 This section has been kept to a minimum. For a more comprehensive description of statistical analysis, see,
for instance, Hanemann and Kanninen (1999) or Haab and McConnel (2003).
12 The estimation of the objective risk can be found in Lindberg (2006).
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head-light of vehicles). More than half of the respondents (54 percent) stated that they themselves or
someone close to them had been injured as a result of a traffic accident, and over half of the respondents
used luminous tags (56 percent).
The descriptive statistics for the different subsamples reveal similar results. The only group that
differs from the others is Q2 Child; in this group almost all respondents are women (questionnaire was
mailed to the mother), number of children in the household is larger, household income is higher, and
respondents are younger. Regarding the whole sample, compared with the general Swedish population,
the respondents in the sample are slightly younger, with females overrepresented, and drive more on
average (for references, see Andersson, 2007b). Disposable household income is also higher in the sample
compared to the general Swedish population (ca. 12 percent, www.scb.se, 3/10/08).
5.2 Acceptance probability and willingness to pay
The results on probabilities of accepting bids for the different subsamples are shown in Table 3. For the
majority of the questions the probabilities are non-increasing with increased bid-level. However, in Q1
and Q4 the proportion of yes answers is non-monotonic with increased bid-levels. The distributions of
Table 3 also reveal that to change the safety device for a voucher was only accepted for smaller bid levels.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 4 shows the result of the follow-up question to the question about relatives’ safety. Of the
respondents that wanted to rent at least one device for relatives, over half were prepared to rent more
devices. The benevolence goes beyond one and may involve ten or more persons. Between 19 (Q3) and 24
(Q4) percent were prepared to pay the price for a device for the use of relatives or friends. Of these, 14
(Q3) and 18 (Q4) percent were prepared to buy a voucher for their relative’s free consumption, instead
of the safety device. The question on the voucher was made conditional on a yes response to the question
on relative’s safety device, and thus, only 2.7 (Q3) to 4.3 (Q4) percent of the sample were willing to pay
for the safety device and change it for a voucher for free consumption.
[Table 4 about here.]
Non-parametric and parametric mean WTP and WTP ratios are shown in Table 5.13 We derive
valuation ratios by relating the WTP for the different subsamples to WTP for Q1 Private. We observe
that: (i) child safety is valued twice and three times as high as private safety in the Turnbull and
13 The results of the multivariate regressions to estimate the parametric mean WTP have been omitted from
the paper, but are available upon request from the authors. The same explanatory variables as in Table 6 were
used in these regressions.
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parametric model, respectively, (ii) household safety is valued 70 to 85 percent higher than private
safety, (iii) safety for relatives and friends is valued between 33 and 51 percent of private, and (iv) WTP
for the public good is 33 to 57 percent of the WTP for the private good. Whereas we can reject our
hypothesis of equal means for our Turnbull estimates, only the parametric mean of subsample Q2 is
statistically significantly different from Q1 Private.
[Table 5 about here.]
The results of the regression on the pooled sample are shown in Table 6. The subsample that was
asked about a private safety device (Q1) is the reference group of the subsamples. The results reveal
that WTP for child and household safety is statistically significantly higher than for own safety, whereas
WTP for safety for relatives and friends and a public safety measure is statistically significantly lower.
Statistical tests also showed that the coefficient estimates of the different subsampels were significantly
different (p-value < 0.01), with one exception Q4 Relative and Q5 Public. Regarding the other covariates
we find that WTP is increasing with household income but decreasing with the number of adults in the
household, and higher and lower among respondents with accident experience and perceived risk lower
than the average, respectively.14
[Table 6 about here.]
5.3 Value of statistical cases
The respondents’ WTP reflect their preferences to reduce the risk of both fatalities and severe injuries.
This value can be converted to the value of a severe statistical injury (VSSA) by dividing the WTP with
the risk reduction. In order to derive estimates for the value of a statistical life (VSL) and severe injury
risk (VSSI), we employ death-risk equivalents (Viscusi et al., 1991; Persson et al., 2001b). The death-risk
equivalents (DRE) express non-fatal outcomes in units of death risks. Let Ω, r, and p denote the DRE,
and the severe injury and fatality risk, respectively, then
Ω = VSSI/VSL, (8)
and by assuming the the respondents’ WTP is the sum of their WTP for each risk, VSL and VSSI can
be derived as (Hultkrantz et al., 2006),
VSL = WTP/(Ω∆r +∆p), (9)
14 The variable High risk was dropped from the regressions since it created a perfect correlation in one of the
subsamples.
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and
VSSI = Ω ·VSL. (10)
In this study we use a DRE equal to 0.166, which is based on the official Swedish values used for
BCA (SIKA, 2008). The risk reductions are per 100,000 and are based on the average numbers between
1993-1997, 3 fatalities and 16 severe injuries. In Table 7 we report the values for VSSA, VSL and VSSI
for the private and public safety measures. Focusing on the VSL, the TB for the private safety measure
is SEK 55.89 million which is 3 times as high as the WTP for the public safety measure. The parametric
estimates are higher, but the ratio between the private and the public safety measure is lower, i.e. 1.7.
[Table 7 about here.]
6 Discussion
This study examines individuals’ WTP for different safety devices and devices for different beneficiaries.
Among other things, we find that WTP for a child is higher than private WTP, that WTP for a household
is not higher than WTP for a single child, and that WTP for a private good is higher than for a public
good. The results concerning child and public WTP are in line with other findings in the literature (Liu
et al., 2000; Johannesson et al., 1996; de Blaeij et al., 2003).
The predominant assumption in the analysis of people’s valuation of safety is that they are selfish.
However, our results indicate that they are not purely selfish, but are prepared to pay for the safety of
children, relatives and friends. Based on our findings it can be argued that the most likely form of non-
selfish preferences is safety paternalism. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the respondents
have pure altruistic or paternalistic preferences. When we do try to distinguish between the forms of
altruistic preferences using the vouchers for the relatives, we can only conclude for 2.7 − 4.3 percent of
the sample that their altruistic preferences are strictly increasing in both wealth and safety (they were
willing to change the safety device for a voucher), though.15 Our results would imply that individuals’
paternalism is safety focused and that we should not ignore non-selfish preferences in BCA.
The result of the comparison between the private and public goods is not consistent with this conclu-
sion of strong benevolence concerning safety. Given that people show strong concern for their relatives’
and friends’ safety we expect that safety for all people in O¨rebro (Q5 Public) is valued higher than pri-
vate safety (Q1 Private) (Andersson, 2007a). That is not the case. For the public good the results imply
15 Our findings are in line with the findings of Jacobsson et al. (2007), who asked subjects to donate either
money or nicotine patches to a smoking diabetes patient. When they asked those subjects who were willing to
donate patches (41 percent) whether they would have donated more or less money, 19 percent said they would
have donated the same amount (81 percent less). Thus, in their study 7.8 percent were prepared to dontate
money instead of patches to the diabetes patient.
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that respondents are either wealth focused paternalists or pure altruists who believe that the project
will reduce the welfare of others. Shogren (1990) showed that individuals may prefer private rather than
public provision of safety. If people believe that public provision of safety will be inefficient they will
favor the private alternative. Moreover, the results regarding non-selfish preferences might also have been
influenced by “warm glow” (manifested in the act of giving instead of financing welfare anonymously
through taxes) (Andreoni, 1989; Crumpler and Grossman, 2008) or “reciprocity” (individuals are willing
to contribute to a public good if others also are willing to contribute) (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002). Reciprocity implies, for instance, that individuals are not prepared to contribute to
a public good if serious free riding is expected. Hence, both warm glow and reciprocity can explain the
higher WTP for the safety of someone close to oneself (child or household member) compared with WTP
for a public safety measure.
Hultkrantz et al. (2006) also estimated respondents’ WTP to eliminate fatalities and severe injuries
from road traffic in the city of O¨rebro. Their estimates are based on a parametric model and certainty
calibration (Blumenschein et al., 2008), and were used to revise the official Swedish VSL to SEK 21
million (in 2006 price level, SIKA, 2008). Compared to their estimates of VSSA, VSL, and VSSI ours are
close based on TB but higher using the parametric model. For instance, in 2006 price level, our estimates
of private and public VSL using TB are SEK 62 and 20 million and based on the logit model SEK
92 and 53 million, whereas theirs were SEK 54 and 20 million. The usefulness of a direct comparison is
limited, however, since the values in Hultkrantz et al. (2006), but not in our study, are based on certainty
calibration. Since both Hultkrantz et al. (2006) and our survey asked respondents about a safety measure
that would eliminate fatalities and severe injuries, estimates may be biased due to the certainty premium
(Viscusi, 1989). The empirical support for a certainty premium is weak, however. The values of both
studies are both higher and within the range of other Swedish CVM studies (Persson and Cedervall,
1991; Johannesson et al., 1996; Persson et al., 2001a; Johannesson et al., 1996; Andersson, 2007b).
In the survey we used a scenario where the safety devices would eliminate the risk of fatalities and
severe injuries in road traffic. Even if the people of O¨rebro are familiar with Vision zero, since it has
been given a lot of attention in the city and in Sweden, the credibility of the scenario presented in
this study is a potential weakness of the survey. This together with the potential certainty premium,
and the mixed results on the form of the respondents’ altruistic preferences, means that we are not
prepared to suggest that our VSL, VSSI, and VSSA estimates are used for policy purposes. Our results
are, however, important from both a research and policy perspective; the findings in this study on the
relationships between respondents’ WTP for own safety, safety for others close to them and for the public
therefore contribute to the understanding of people’s altruistic preferences in road safety, and highlights
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the difficulty of eliciting preferences for private and public safety. Moreover, the reliability of the CVM
in deriving a WTP to reduce health risks has been questioned. Serious problem with embedding, scope
and framing effects have been found (Beattie et al., 1998; Hammitt and Graham, 1999). We believe that
these problems are most severe when it comes to estimating policy values, such as the VSL, however,
and hence not a problem for the purpose of this study.
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Accept a safety
device for
relatives?
Safety paternalistic
or pure altruist or
paternalist
Selfish or wealth
paternalist
Accept
a voucher?
Pure altruist or
paternalist
Safety paternalistic
or pure altruist or
paternalist
-
HHHHj
©©
©©
*
©©
©*
HHHjYes
No
Yes
No
Fig. 1 The chosen questionnaire scheme for relative’s safety
Table 1 Subsamples of the survey
Sample Non-
Subsample Question size responsea Completedb
Q1 Private WTP private safety measure. 390 162 (12) 216 (57%)
Q2 Child WTP to reduce child’s risk. 390 170 (4) 206 (54%)
Q3 Householdc 1. WTP household. 390 179 (9) 202 (53%)
2. WTP relative.
3. Voucher relative.
Q4 Relativec 1. WTP relative. 390 185 (10) 195 (51%)
2. Voucher relative.
Q5 Public WTP for public safety measure. 390 159 (9) 222 (58%)
TOTAL 1950 855 (44) 1040 (55%)
a: Unknown (wrong address and could not be contacted) in parentheses.
b: Percentage in parentheses excluding unknown.
c: Numbers refer to order in which the questions were asked.
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Table 3 Probabilities of accepting bids
Q1 Q2 Q3 Household Q4 Relative Q5
Bid Private Child Householda Safety Voucher Safety Voucher Public
200 0.658 0.861 0.667 0.410 0.250 0.605 0.217 0.535
1000 0.679 0.704 0.533 0.300 0.111 0.269 0.000 0.297
2000 0.290 0.571 0.351 0.216 0.000 0.235 0.286 0.172
5000 0.163 0.382 0.212 0.121 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.132
10000 0.083 0.324 0.081 0.027 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.027
20000 0.147 0.207 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a: The bid levels when asked about household safety were twice the size of the bids in column one.
Table 4 Number of demanded safety devices for relatives.
Q3 Householda Q4 Relativea
Bidb 1 2 3-11 >11 1 2 3-11 >11
200 7 5 4 0 6 8 9 0
1000 2 1 5 1 4 2 1 0
2000 6 1 1 0 5 3 0 0
5000 1 2 0 1 3 1 0 0
10000 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 0
Proportionc 0.42 0.24 0.29 0.05 0.43 0.30 0.26 0
a: Number of responses.
b: Bid level 20,000 omitted from table since proportion yes answers
equal to zero.
c: Of all yes responses
Table 5 Non-parametric and parametric mean WTP
Q1 Q2 Q3 Household Q4 Q5
Private Child Household Relative Relative Public
Turnbull
Mean WTP 3,161d 6,144 5,388 1,037 1,499d 1,047
Ratioa - 1.944 1.704 0.328 0.474 0.331
t-valueb - 4.14 2.54 3.13 2.59 3.12
Parametric
Mean WTP 4,712 15,638 8,440 1,582 2,495 2,696e
Ratioa - 3.319 1.791 0.336 0.530 0.572
C.I.c: Lower 2,660 7,844 4,135 505 1,010 1,086
Upper 7,776 29,768 14,210 2,680 4,043 4,763
a: Ratio between WTP for the different subsamples and Q1 Private.
b: t-value for difference in mean estimates between Q1 Private and corresponding subsample.
c: 95% confidence intervals. (Bootstrap, 5,000 replications.)
d: PAVA used to estimate WTP since probability vector non-monotonic (Ayer et al., 1955).
e: Mean WTP for the Q5 Public was estimated ruling out negative WTP. Allowing for
negative WTP reveal the same qualitative relationship between Q1 and Q5.
Benevolence and the value of road safety 21
Table 6 Multivariate WTP regression
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Q2 Child 7374.62∗∗ (1802.29)
Q3 Household 2701.37† (1562.41)
Q4 Relative -3834.61∗ (1618.08)
Q5 Public -3408.39∗ (1570.54)
Incomea 290.95∗∗ (70.19)
Female -1814.88 (1154.23)
Age 24.53 (38.69)
Driving distance -0.37 (0.39)
Luminous tag 399.50 (1049.98)
Injury 3712.99∗∗ (1034.47)
Low risk -3629.26∗∗ (1397.69)
Child -398.30 (567.57)
Adult -1927.01† (1014.50)
Intercept -2826.77 (2821.74)
N 942
Pseudo R2 0.21
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
a: Household income per 1,000 SEK.
Table 7 Value of statistical cases in million SEK
Turnbull Parametric
VSSA VSL VSSI VSSA VSL VSSI
Private 16.64 55.89 8.61 24.80 83.31 13.98
Public 5.51 18.51 2.85 14.19 47.67 7.91
VSSA=WTP/∆pi, VSL=WTP/(Ω∆r +∆p), VSSI= Ω·VSL
Death risk equivalent, Ω = 0.154
Risk changes per 100,000: (i) severe morbidity and mortality,
∆pi = 19, (ii) morbidity, ∆r = 16, and (iii) mortality, ∆p = 3.
